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GOLDEN PARACHUTES, SEVERANCE, AND FIRM VALUE  
Andrew C.W. Lund* 
Robert Schonlau** 
Golden parachutes (GPs) are now standard contract provisions for 
public company CEOs. While they have become ubiquitous, they have 
also been severely criticized for harming shareholder value. As a result, 
GPs are subjected to intense shareholder activism and are uniquely 
penalized under both tax and securities law. Recent empirical work 
suggests that they may indeed be associated with poor firm performance, 
validating the steps taken to reduce or eliminate GPs.  
This Article offers reasons to rethink the consensus that has 
developed around GPs. First, this Article highlights a substantial 
endogeneity problem, which earlier studies linking GPs and firm values 
fail to fully answer. Second, this Article’s novel empirical analysis 
suggests that the earlier evidence linking GPs with lower firm values is 
not robust to the use of more recent data and may have been driven by 
the omission of complete data regarding regular severance promises. It 
may be that regular severance promises, rather than GPs, drive poor 
performance and that past results to the contrary are likely based on 
incomplete data in prior periods. These findings comport with a set of 
relatively uncontroversial arguments for severance’s dominance over 
GPs when it comes to shaping CEO incentives. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that law and market participants ought not to necessarily 
view GPs as uniquely problematic. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Golden parachutes (GPs) have become standard contract provisions 
for public company CEOs. In 2013, over eighty percent of S&P 1500 
companies promised their CEO additional payments in the event of their 
termination following a change in control of the firm.1 Since their 
introduction over thirty years ago,2 these promises have been criticized 
on a number of grounds ranging from their distributive consequences to 
the degree to which they may harm shareholder value. This general 
antipathy toward GPs has culminated in a series of unique regulatory and 
non-regulatory penalties on the provisions. The tax code imposes harsh 
rules on them unlike any other set of compensation promises.3 More 
recently, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Dodd–Frank Act)4 subjects GPs alone, among all compensation 
provisions, to their own “say-on” vote by shareholders.5 In addition to 
explicit regulation, the business press, politicians, and academics often 
single out GPs for criticism.  
Until recently, however, their effect on shareholder value has been 
unclear. On the one hand, GPs may serve as an adaptive device that aligns 
managers’ interests with those of shareholders, particularly shareholders’ 
interest in receiving takeover bids at a premium to current share prices.6 
On the other hand, GPs might provide significant ex ante effort 
disincentives for CEOs by mitigating the threat of employment 
termination,7 a point made with increasing specificity by several recent 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See Vipal Monga, Approval on Golden Parachutes Rose in 2013, WALL ST. J.: THE CFO 
REP. (Dec. 30, 2013, 3:18 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2013/12/30/approval-on-golden-
parachutes-rose-in-2013.  
 2. See PAUL A. ARGENTI, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 212 (2016) (noting that “the term 
‘golden parachute’ was first used in 1961”).  
 3. See Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive 
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 514–16 (2009).  
 4. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).  
 5. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(b)(2). 
 6. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case of 
Manager-Specific Investments, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 132 (1989). 
 7. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders, 25 J. 
CORP. FIN. 140, 150–51 (2014) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Wealth of Shareholders]; Lucian 
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studies.8 For instance, Professors Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and 
Charles C.Y. Wang recently found that GP presence was correlated with 
both low firm value (measured in terms of buy-and-hold portfolio values) 
at the time of adoption and deteriorating firm value post-adoption.9 These 
results could imply that (1) GPs are inefficient contract terms and perhaps 
the result of managerial power during contract negotiations and (2) the 
regulatory interventions described above are appropriately targeted and 
perhaps ought to be augmented to constrain GPs even further.   
There remain questions about each of the earlier studies on their own 
terms.10 Leaving such issues to the side, this Article reexamines the 
evidence linking GPs to firm value destruction using more recent data. 
Rather than merely updating prior work, this Article enhances the 
literature by including new data on another common term in CEO 
employment agreements—regular severance promised to CEOs upon 
termination, regardless of a change in control. Prior to 2006 the SEC 
disclosure requirements did not require regular reporting of severance 
arrangements with many firms simply not providing the information in 
public documents. Hence, prior studies were unable to effectively control 
for regular severance. Comparing the percent of CEOs at S&P 1500 firms 
reporting regular severance packages just after the new disclosure 
requirements with the percent who made voluntary disclosures of such 
arrangements prior to 2006 illustrates the extent of the under reporting 
problem. For example, the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC) data used in those earlier studies indicate that only 6.0% of CEOs 
at S&P 1500 firms had regular severance arrangements in 2004. In 
contrast, in 2006 with the new disclosure requirements the ExecuComp 
data indicates that 50.2% of the CEOs at S&P 1500 firms had regular 
severance arrangements.11 The under-reporting of severance 
arrangements reflected in the IRRC data is important considering that 
regular severance provides similar and perhaps greater CEO-effort 
disincentives than do GPs.12  
                                                                                                                     
Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 793 (2009) 
[hereinafter Bebchuk et al., What Matters?]; Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and 
Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 148 (2003); Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 6, at 132. 
 8. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., What Matters?, supra note 7, at 798, 805 (GP adoption is one 
of six variables in the streamlined “E Index”); Gompers et al., supra note 7, at 128–29, 148 (GP 
adoption is one of twenty-four variables in the “G Index”). 
 9. See Bebchuk et al., Wealth of Shareholders, supra note 7, at 151–53. 
 10. In their most recent work, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang acknowledge the 
substantial endogeneity issue facing their study and use various sophisticated approaches in an 
attempt to resolve it. See id. at 144. As discussed in Section I.A below, this Article cautions that 
causal inferences may remain problematic despite those attempts. 
 11. IRRC collected data in 2004 but not 2005. Id. at 142. Past studies assume that 
governance variables, including severance, remain constant in years without data. Id. 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 117– 20. 
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This Article uses GP and severance data on S&P 1500 firms from 
ExecuComp, following the implementation of new SEC disclosure rules 
in 2006. This data is rich and, unlike earlier research using the IRRC data, 
includes the dollar amounts associated with each type of post-
employment package. This Article also presents hand-collected proxy 
data from 2009 for S&P 500 firms to confirm the accuracy of 
ExecuComp’s data. One of the key findings is that the correlation 
between GPs and lower firm values does not continue into this more 
recent period. A second key finding is that newly transparent regular 
severance promises become significant in the recent period. We obtained 
similar results when we measured GP and severance amount as opposed 
to incidence, an approach that seems more likely to capture any incentive 
effects given the wide variation in amounts promised. In sum, this 
suggests that, in most circumstances, GPs do not create unique effort 
disincentives and certainly none that are distinct from those created by 
other common terms in CEO employment contracts. 13  
Regarding the findings of a significant and negative relationship 
between severance and firm performance, it remains unclear whether that 
relationship is evidence of an effort-disincentive effect. That is because 
the severance findings are subject to the same omitted variable concerns 
discussed above. Despite the limitations to this empirical approach, we 
deliberately utilized the same approach as used in the earlier GP papers, 
not only to be consistent with the literature but also to highlight that (1) 
even using such an approach, the correlation between GPs and lower firm 
values are not robust to recent periods and (2) a different CEO contract 
term, severance, appears to be more significant for firm performance than 
previously believed. Ultimately, more work is necessary to determine if 
such contract provisions contribute to poor firm performance.  
Part I of this Article describes GPs and regular severance as well as 
briefly examines the theory and evidence surrounding each. Part II offers 
this Article’s findings of GP and regular severance incidence and 
magnitude. It also presents findings regarding post-termination promises 
and their relationship to firm value. This Article concludes suggesting the 
limitations of conclusions researchers may draw about the harm caused 
by GPs. 
I.  GOLDEN PARACHUTES AND REGULAR SEVERANCE  
This Part begins with a description of GPs and regular severance, briefly 
explaining the theory and evidence surrounding each. Next, it examines how 
certain phenomena influence the relationship between GPs and effort 
                                                                                                                     
 13. Of course, as is the case with most issues in executive compensation, there may be other 
reasons to discourage the use of GPs, but those matters are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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incentives, on the one hand, and regular severance and GPs, on the other. 
A.  GPs: Theory and Evidence 
Beginning in the early 1980s, large U.S. firms adopted GPs in 
significant numbers as a way to reduce management opposition to 
takeovers.14 An active takeover market allowed acquirers to buy and fix 
unsuccessful firms15 while sharing a portion of the future value with the 
selling shareholders.16 Because the entire process relied on the new 
owners monitoring and disciplining target management, those managers 
understandably anticipated that a takeover could result in personal losses 
up to and including termination.17 Thus, the threat of a takeover was also 
thought to lead managers to exert more effort in the first instance so as to 
make the firm a less attractive target.18 In this way, even if most firms 
were not ultimately taken over, the shareholders benefitted from a vibrant 
takeover market as it lowered agency costs at firms generally.19  
Incumbent managers, however, were in a position to frustrate 
takeovers by virtue of their control of the target company,20 causing many 
takeover attempts to fail.21 In response, shareholders and their advocates 
sought devices that would invigorate the market for corporate control 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-
Making, and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179, 179 (1985). 
 15. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1184 (1981); Ronald J. 
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender 
Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841–42 (1981); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for 
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965). 
 16. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 1161. 
 17. See Lambert & Larcker, supra note 14, at 184 (“There are three aspects of the loss 
incurred by the managers of target firms. First, the manager does not receive wages until he finds 
new employment. Second, the manager may not be paid as much in his new job. . . . Finally, the 
manager loses any non-pecuniary benefits of his position, including his power and prestige.”). 
 18. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 6, at 126–32 (“We assume that control mechanisms 
such as . . . hostile takeovers are only partially effective. It is in the interest of the manager to 
make them less effective. We show how manager-specific investments help the manager reduce 
the threat of replacement.”). 
 19. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION 511 (4th ed. 2012). 
 20. The most famous entrenchment device is the poison pill, which effectively prevents 
takeovers unless the target’s board approves them. See Bebchuk et al., What Matters?, supra note 
7, at 792. But more subtle subversion tools are available to target managers. See Brian J. 
Broughman, CEO Side Payments in M&A Deals 18–19 (Ind. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
313, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2584699 (“Targets generally rely 
on their CEO to negotiate the merger agreement. This position gives the CEO considerable 
discretion to negotiate personal benefits into the agreement that is sent to the board.”). 
 21. Jay C. Hartzell et al., What’s in It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 37, 37 (2004).  
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generally and encourage target managers to be open to takeover bids 
specifically. Increased equity compensation naturally pushed in this 
direction because takeovers would offer a premium to current share prices 
and perhaps early vesting,22 but even managers with a significant equity 
stake in the firm often faced a net financial loss upon takeover and 
termination. GPs make takeovers incrementally more palatable for target 
managers by promising additional payments.23 Specifically, GPs commit 
acquirers to pay severance and other amounts to target managers for a 
period of time following (and, in some cases, targets for a period of time 
prior to) a change in control.24 In fact, some GPs do not require a 
subsequent termination of employment before being paid out,25 but these 
so-called “single-trigger” GPs have fallen out of favor in recent times.26  
Usually, the GP defines a “change in control” trigger as a merger, the 
acquisition of some percentage of company shares, or turnover of the 
incumbent board.27 A number of subsequent termination scenarios then 
serve as a second trigger resulting in the GP payment.28 Those scenarios 
commonly involve a termination by the company without “cause” or a 
resignation by the CEO for “good reason.”29 The GP payment often 
includes a multiple of salary and bonus.30 It also usually permits 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See id. at 44–45; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying 
and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 884 (2002).  
 23. See Bebchuk et al., What Matters?, supra note 7, at 793. 
 24. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design 
of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 834–36 (2002) (discussing the use of GPs to 
discourage CEOs from blocking takeovers). 
 25. See Walther, Note, Employment Agreements and Tender Offers: Reforming the 
Problematic Treatment of Severance Plans Under Rule 14d-10, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 782 
n.25 (2002) (stating that single-trigger chutes “can be pulled simply upon a change in control”). 
 26. See ALVAREZ & MARSAL TAXAND, LLC, EXECUTIVE CHANGE IN CONTROL REPORT 
2013/2014 9 (2014), http://www.alvarezandmarsal.com/sites/default/files/Change%20in%
20Control.pdf (reporting that, in 2013, ninety-six percent of companies with agreements included 
double-trigger payouts and only nine percent of companies with agreements included single-
trigger payouts). We found single-trigger payouts in 9.8% of GPs in our hand-collected data.  
 27. See Lambert & Larcker, supra note 14, at 179. Sales of substantially all assets of the 
company are usually covered as well.  
 28. See Ben Walther, supra note 25, at 782 n.25 (stating that double-trigger chutes can be 
pulled “only upon [the executive] losing his or her job within a certain time after a change in 
control”).  
 29. Simone M. Sepe & Charles K. Whitehead, Rethinking Chutes: Incentives, Investment, 
and Innovation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 2027, 2041 (2015). For more on definitions of “cause” and “good 
reason,” see Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment 
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain for?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 249 tbl.3, 253 
(2006) (noting “just cause” for CEO termination triggers including willful misconduct, moral 
turpitude, and failure to perform duties, and “good reason” for CEO resignation triggers including 
diminution in responsibilities, diminution in compensation, and forced relocation). 
 30. Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 29, at 2042.  
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accelerated vesting of equity awards,31 if not already effected by the 
change in control event under the terms of the relevant equity 
compensation plans. Many GPs promise other items, including 
continuation of perquisites, outplacement services, and enhanced 
contributions to retirement plans.32 Finally, GPs may include provisions 
to deal with tax consequences unique to the GP context,33 up to a promise 
to gross up the CEO for any excise tax he would have to pay on account 
of the GP.34 
Those tax consequences are the result of the first legislative attack on 
GPs.35 In 1984, Congress responded to a spate of high-profile transactions 
and a related group of high-profile GPs by passing Sections 280G and 
4999 of the Internal Revenue Code as part of the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 1984.36 The former prevented firms from taking a normal 
compensation deduction for “excess parachute payments,”37 while the 
latter imposed a twenty-percent excise tax on recipients of excess 
parachute payments.38 Until the adoption of Section 409A in 2004, which 
restricted payment of deferred compensation to executives,39 GPs were 
the only terms in an executive employment agreement subject to their 
own special tax penalty.40  
More recently, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Act.41 The Act 
includes a requirement that public companies submit the entirety of their 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 2042–43. We found these “other” amounts at seventy-six percent of firms that 
make some sort of GP promise. 
 33. See I.R.C. § 280G (2012) (excluding company deduction for excess parachute 
payments); id. § 4099 (imposing excise tax on recipients of excess parachute payment). 
 34. Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 29, at 2043. In our hand-collected data, for instance, we 
found excise tax gross-ups at 29.8% of firms with GPs in place. See infra Part II for more 
descriptive statistics. 
 35. See Steven E. Prokesch, Too Much Gold in the Parachutes?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 1986), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/26/business/too-much-gold-in-the-parachutes.html (“The golden 
parachute provision of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 marked the first legislative attempt to curb 
excessive golden parachutes.”). 
 36. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 67(a), (b)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 585, 587 (codified as amended at 
I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999 (2012)). See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Greenmail, Golden Parachutes 
and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax Policy Critique of Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881, 35 VILL. 
L. REV. 131 (1990) (discussing the history of Sections 280G and 4999). 
 37. I.R.C. § 280G(a).  
 38. Id. § 4999(a). 
 39. See id. § 409A(a).  
 40. Section 162(m) also imposes tax consequences on high levels of pay that are not 
sufficiently “performance-based.” See id. § 162(m); Mullane, supra note 3, at 519–26; Gregg D. 
Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
877, 884–85 (2007). 
 41. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). 
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executive compensation arrangements to a non-binding say-on-pay 
vote.42 In a lesser-known provision, the Dodd–Frank Act also includes a 
specific “say-on-GP” provision, which requires public companies to (1) 
disclose any GPs when soliciting shareholder votes on sales, mergers, or 
other dispositions43 and (2) submit those GPs for a special advisory 
shareholder vote.44 Thus, GPs are the only term in CEO compensation 
contracts subjected to their own discrete shareholder votes.45  
The results of such votes have generally been favorable for GPs. 
According to a Pearl Meyer white paper, of the 298 GP votes held 
between implementation in 2011 and October 31, 2013, seventy percent 
resulted in high shareholder approval (eighty-percent approval or 
greater), while only five percent of cases resulted in a majority of 
negative votes.46 On the other hand, Institutional Shareholder Services 
                                                                                                                     
 42. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a) (requiring firms to submit to a nonbinding say-on-pay vote 
once every one, two, or three years, with that vote occurring no less frequently than once every 
six years). 
 43. See id. § 78n-1(b)(1). Many targets already disclosed such information in proxy 
solicitations pursuant to Item 5 of Schedule 14A, which requires disclosure of “any substantial 
interest, direct or indirect, by security holdings or otherwise, of any person who has been an 
executive officer or director since the beginning of the last fiscal year in any matter to be acted 
upon.” Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation, Exchange Act Release No. 9153, 99 
SEC Docket 2041 (Oct. 18, 2010). 
 44. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(b)(2). 
 45. See id. § 78n-1(a)(1) (permitting firms to avoid the special vote by disclosing GPs at an 
earlier date, thereby making them subject to the regular say-on-pay advisory vote). To qualify as 
having been subject to a prior say-on-pay vote (and thus exempt from the specific GP advisory 
vote requirement at a later date), firms must disclose information required by Item 402(t) of 
Regulation S-K. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(t) (2015). For annual report purposes, on the other hand, 
they need only provide information under Item 402(j). See id. § 229.402(j). The two disclosures 
are similar; thus, one might have expected firms to disclose under 402(t) to receive the waiver 
from future say-on-GP votes. However, practitioners report that few firms are availing themselves 
of this option, instead choosing to submit GPs to a shareholder vote in the event of a later deal. 
See MICHAEL G. O’BRYAN ET AL., MORRISON FOERSTER, NEW GOLDEN PARACHUTE 
COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE AND SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY VOTE REQUIREMENTS 2 (2011), 
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110603-SEC-Golden-Parachute-Requirements.pdf 
(“Based on the filings thus far this proxy season, it is unlikely that companies will often use the 
Say-on-Pay vote exception. In the months since the requirement for a mandatory Say-on-Pay vote 
became effective, only a handful of issuers have voluntarily included the Item 402(t) golden 
parachute compensation disclosures in their annual meeting proxy statements.” (footnote 
omitted)). It seems likely that firms view the downside of waiting for a say-on-GP vote at the time 
of a deal as being relatively small since the advisory nature of the vote pushes all consequences 
into the future while final period transactions trigger most GPs. 
 46. MARGARET BLACK & DAN WETZEL, PEARL MEYER & PARTNERS, SAY ON GOLDEN 
PARACHUTE VOTES 1 (2013), http://www.pearlmeyer.com/Pearl/media/PearlMeyer/Articles
Whitepapers/PMP-ART-SOGPUpdate-12-17-2013.pdf. 
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(ISS) is becoming more aggressive in its recommendations against GPs.47 
ISS and other firms have guidelines relating to GPs that predate the say-
on-GP regime.48 ISS’s 2013 Proxy Voting Guidelines state that the 
company will make case-by-case recommendations with respect to say-
on-GP votes and go on to list a number of GP features it generally 
opposes—single-trigger severance or equity-vesting acceleration, cash 
severance greater than three times base salary and bonus, 280G excise tax 
gross-ups, etc.—but the guidelines do not indicate how the features will 
be weighted in the company’s analysis or how GP compliance will be 
weighted in a general say-on-pay vote.49 Other shareholder advisors and 
institutional shareholders have begun to adopt similar guidelines. Glass, 
Lewis & Co., ISS’s most significant competitor, has adopted guidelines 
which are, if anything, even more opaque.50 Vanguard, similar to other 
institutional investors, has explicitly accepted that GPs may be 
appropriate in most contexts, subject to restraints on specific features.51  
All of the anti-GP activity leaves unsettled the question of whether 
GPs actually increase or decrease shareholder wealth. Obviously, GPs 
might increase shareholder value by encouraging more takeovers at 
                                                                                                                     
 47. See id. at 3 (“These recent changes in its voting guidelines appear to be increasing the 
likelihood that ISS will issue a negative voting recommendation on transaction pay proposals. In 
fact, ISS seems to be doing so roughly twice as often as for Say on Pay proposals. Negative voting 
recommendations were made for 35 of the 125 SOGP proposals (approximately 28%) brought 
before shareholders in meetings between February 1, 2013 and October 31, 2013. In contrast, 20% 
of proposals received ‘Against’ recommendations in voting results filed through December 31, 
2012, as reported in our March 2013 update.”).  
 48. See, e.g., GEORGESON S’HOLDER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANNUAL MEETING SEASON 
WRAP-UP 4 (1996), http://www.computershare-na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr1996.pdf. 
This makes sense given the common belief that GPs were the subject of a large number of 
shareholder proposals in earlier periods. See Bebchuk et al., Wealth of Shareholders, supra note 
7, at 140. In fact, Georgeson Annual Corporate Governance reports categorized shareholder 
proposals relating to all forms of severance as “Golden Parachute” proposals, artificially inflating 
the perceived levels of shareholder dissatisfaction with GPs in particular. GEORGESON S’HOLDER, 
supra, at 4. 
 49. See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2013 U.S. PROXY VOTING SUMMARY GUIDELINES 
54, http://www.issgovernance.com/files/2013ISSUSSummaryGuidelines1312013.pdf. 
 50. See GLASS, LEWIS & CO., PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES 7 (2012), 
http://www.glasslewis.com/assets/uploads/2012/02/Guidelines_UnitedStates_2013_Abridged
1.pdf (noting that “[e]gregious or excessive bonuses, equity awards or severance payments, 
including golden handshakes and golden parachutes” are factors that militate in favor of a negative 
recommendation on a say-on-pay vote). 
 51. See Vanguard’s Proxy Voting Guidelines, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.com/
about/vanguards-proxy-voting-guidelines (last visited Feb. 1, 2016) (“Although executives’ 
incentives for continued employment should be more significant than severance benefits, there 
are instances, particularly in the event of a change in control, in which severance arrangements 
may be appropriate. Severance benefits payable upon a change of control AND an executive’s 
termination (so-called double-trigger plans) are generally acceptable to the extent that benefits 
paid do not exceed three times salary and bonus.”). 
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premiums to current share prices.52 GPs might also allow current 
shareholders to shift compensation costs onto future shareholders.53 
Finally, GPs might encourage managers to pursue risky projects and 
manage for the long-term by reducing the penalties for short-term failure 
normally associated with takeovers.54 On the other hand, GPs necessarily 
involve the diversion of some of the takeover premium from shareholders 
to executives.55 Beyond that obvious distributional concern, recent 
academic criticisms of GPs have focused more on the potential for GPs 
to exacerbate agency costs at public firms.56 Specifically, by making 
terminations less painful, GPs might create effort disincentives for CEOs.  
The theoretical ambivalence about GPs has led to substantial 
empirical research over the years. Numerous studies have examined 
whether GPs have actually resulted in more takeovers.57 GPs have been 
associated with an increased likelihood of a firm receiving a takeover bid 
and being subject to takeover activity generally.58 In certain studies, more 
“important” parachutes were associated with higher likelihood of deal 
completion and lower acquisition premia,59 while in others GPs were not 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Albert Choi, Golden Parachute as a Compensation-Shifting Mechanism, 20 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 170, 183 (2004) (suggesting that GPs permitted target shareholders to shift some 
of their ex ante compensation burden onto acquirers). 
 54. See Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 29, at 2033–34. 
 55. See Lambert & Larcker, supra note 14, at 185 (“[T]he GP increases the cost of a [sic] 
conducting a takeover and dismissing management. That is, the GP contract requires the acquiring 
firm to retain and/or compensate executives that it might prefer to terminate. This reduces the 
takeover premium that the acquiring firm is willing to pay.”). 
 56. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 24, at 754. There are, of course, other criticisms of GPs, 
mostly centered on concerns for distributive justice. See, e.g., Paul G. Wilhelm, Application of 
Distributive Justice Theory to the CEO Pay Problem: Recommendations for Reform, 12 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 469, 472–73 (1993). 
 57. See, e.g., Thomas W. Bates et al., Board Classification and Managerial Entrenchment: 
Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 656, 671 (2008); Jeffery A. 
Born et al., Golden Parachutes: Incentive Aligners, Management Entrenchers, or Takeover Bid 
Signals?, 16 J. FIN. RES. 299, 303 (1993); Eliezer M. Fich et al., On the Importance of Golden 
Parachutes, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1717, 1718 (2013); Ellie G. Harris, 
Antitakeover Measures, Golden Parachutes, and Target Firm Shareholder Welfare, 21 RAND J. 
ECON. 614, 614 (1990); Hartzell et al., supra note 21, at 38–39; Judith C. Machlin et al., The 
Effects of Golden Parachutes on Takeover Activity, 36 J.L. & ECON. 861, 861 (1993); Jonathan 
M. Karpoff et al., Do Takeover Defenses Deter Takeovers? 2–3 (Aug. 14, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2608759. 
 58. See Bates et al., supra note 57, at 671 (finding firms with GPs 1.8% more likely to 
receive a takeover bid); Machlin et al., supra note 57, at 868 (noting that firms with GPs are more 
likely to undergo a change in control than firms without). 
 59. See, e.g., Fich et al., supra note 57, at 1728–30. The researchers derived the 
“importance” of the parachute by scaling it against a model of lost wages for given CEOs. Id. at 
1725. 
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associated with a decrease in premia.60 Recent work on the subject by 
Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang found a correlation consistent 
with the former group (GP adoption associated with higher incidence of 
takeovers but lower takeover premia) and further found that incidence 
dominated premium amount such that GPs are correlated with higher 
expected unconditional takeover premia.61 Moreover, the authors found 
that even “older” GPs were associated with higher incidence of takeovers, 
indicating that an executive’s private information leading her to seek out 
a GP in advance of an expected takeover does not drive the observed 
effect on deal activity.62 
But increased deal premia do not necessarily mean that GPs are an 
unalloyed good from a shareholder perspective since such findings do not 
examine what happened to the firm after GP adoption but prior to a 
takeover bid. Some early work found significant negative returns 
following announcement of a GP, suggesting that the market may have 
predicted an effort-disincentive effect.63 However, other work found 
conflicting results or no relationship at all.64 More recently, a set of 
sophisticated studies has found a correlation between GP adoption and 
lower firm values measured in terms of Tobin’s Q, which is the ratio 
between a firm’s assets and its market value. Professors Paul A. Gompers, 
Joy L. Ishii, and Andrew Metrick included GP adoption in their 
“governance index” (G index), although they admitted that theoretical 
accounts were ambivalent about GPs’ effect on managerial 
entrenchment.65 They found that GP adoption, when aggregated with 
twenty-three other governance features tending toward entrenchment, 
was correlated with lower firm value, though they could not determine 
causality.66 Importantly for our project, regular severance incidence was 
also included as a variable in the G index.67  
 
                                                                                                                     
 60. See, e.g., Machlin et al, supra note 57, at 872. But see Born et al., supra note 57, at 305–
06 (noting that the presence of GPs correlated with higher cumulative abnormal returns). 
 61. See Bebchuk et al, Wealth of Shareholders, supra note 7, at 147–48. 
 62. See id. at 150. 
 63. See, e.g., Pamela L. Hall & Dwight C. Anderson, The Effect of Golden Parachutes on 
Shareholder Wealth and Takeover Probabilities, 24 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 445, 454–55 (1997); 
Damian J. Mogavero & Michael F. Toyne, The Impact of Golden Parachutes on 
Fortune 500 Stock Returns: A Reexamination of the Evidence, 34 Q.J. BUS. & ECON. 30, 35 (1995). 
 64. See, e.g., Lambert & Larcker, supra note 14, at 201 (positive returns upon GP 
announcement); Born et al., supra note 57, at 299 (no abnormal returns upon GP announcement). 
 65. See Gompers et al, supra note 7, at 148. The researchers found a correlation between 
GP adoption and fifteen of the other “Dictatorship” provisions, indicating that GPs restricted 
shareholder rights. See id. 
 66. See id. at 142, 144–45. 
 67. See id. at 112 tbl. 1, 149–50 (listing regular severance as one of the provisions used for 
the G index calculation). 
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Next, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Allen Ferrell included GP 
adoption as one of six G index provisions in their streamlined 
“entrenchment index” (E index).68 They found that the presence of GPs—
along with classified boards, bylaw and charter amendment restrictions, 
supermajority voting provisions, and poison pills—proved explanatory 
for the declines in firm value observed in Professors Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick’s research.69 This was the case for GPs even controlling for 
regular severance and the other components of the G index.70  
But the interpretation of the observed correlation between GPs and 
firm performance is subject to endogeneity concerns, as there is a fairly 
obvious omitted variable: private information a CEO-to-be might have 
about poor firm prospects. Because GPs function in part as an insurance 
plan in the case of poor performance, CEOs with knowledge that firm 
prospects are bleak may be more apt to demand them.71 That such firms 
then experience declines in value is hardly surprising. Professors 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang explicitly recognize this issue in their recent 
paper72 and go to great lengths to grapple with it. They use buy-and-hold 
portfolios centered on “long-term GP adopters” and find a correlation 
between GP adoption and lower firm value both at the time of adoption 
and over a subsequent two-year period.73 Again, they control for many of 
the G index variables, including regular severance.74  
That firm values decline subsequent to adoption might indicate that 
GPs are causing shareholder value to decline. But given that the 
subsequent period is only two years post-adoption, it is equally plausible 
that the negative firm prospects leading to the adoption of the GP 
continued to influence poor firm performance in the second year out.75 
Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang transparently acknowledge as 
                                                                                                                     
 68. See Bebchuk et al., What Matters?, supra note 7, at 805. 
 69. See id. at 797 tbl.1. 
 70. See id. at 805–06. 
 71. See Lambert & Larcker, supra note 14, at 189. 
 72. Bebchuk et al., Wealth of Shareholders, supra note 7, at 151 (“Such a correlation [found 
in earlier work] could arise either because GPs have a negative effect on shareholder value or 
because of a selection effect (i.e., the greater tendency of low-value firms to have GPs). However, 
the current literature has not disentangled these two effects, and we therefore proceed to examine 
further the impact of GPs on shareholder value.”). 
 73. Id. at 153. Specifically, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang compare firms with GPs 
in the prior, current, and subsequent IRRC volumes with “long-term non-adopters”—firms that 
do not have GPs in the previous, current, and succeeding IRRC volumes. Id. 
 74. Id. at 144. 
 75. The researchers attempt to solve for this by including acquired firms with GPs as “GP 
adopters” to artificially raise the returns of adopting firms, since acquired firms should show an 
increase in valuation. Id. at 152–53. Even with this “push,” they found statistically significant 
negative valuation differences between GP long-term adopters and others, and they interpret these 
findings to be consistent with the GP effort–effect hypothesis. Id. at 153. 
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much: “[I]t could be suggested that [the results] are driven by a selection 
effect. Under this explanation, the firms with GPs that face higher 
acquisition likelihood but are not acquired for three consecutive IRRC 
volumes could be very poorly performing firms.”76 Making the strongest 
case available, they then included all firms acquired during the post-GP 
measurement period that had been excluded in the earlier specifications.77 
One would reasonably predict that acquired firms would both (1) have 
had GPs and (2) experience abnormal positive returns due to the 
acquisition.78 Even after including these firms, Professors Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Wang found significant negative abnormal returns.79 
At the time of this Article’s publication, this represents the last, best 
word on GPs’ effects on firm performance and CEO-effort incentives. 
But as much as this recent work clarifies, it also suggests a puzzle—have 
eighty percent of S&P 1500 firms adopted provisions in their CEO 
contracts that systematically reduce shareholder wealth? Or have the 
studies failed to control for variables that might explain away GPs’ 
apparent effect on firm performance? 
B.  Regular Severance: Theory and Evidence  
One such variable might be regular severance, another common 
provision in CEO employment agreements. Regular severance, like its 
GP cousin, promises to cushion executives against the blow of a “without 
cause” or “good reason” termination.80 Unlike GPs, however, regular 
severance covers terminations when there has been no recent or 
contemporaneous change in corporate control. Regular severance usually 
consists of a cash payment, often based on a multiple of salary and 
bonus,81 and may also include accelerated equity vesting, outplacement 
services, pension enhancements, and continued perquisites.82 Some or all 
of these payments may be conditioned on the executive agreeing to 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Id. at 152. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (“Ex ante, we should expect the inclusion of these stocks to decrease the portfolio 
abnormal returns, since firms with GPs are more likely to be acquired and should therefore be 
more likely to earn positive acquisition premiums.”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Tjomme O. Rusticus, Executive Severance Agreements 4–5 (Feb. 21, 2006) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania), http://areas.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/
Accounting/Lists/Upcoming%20Accounting%20Events/Attachments/13/Rusticus%20Paper.pdf. 
 81. See id. The multiple may be equal to or less than the multiple applied to a GP. There is 
no evidence of a CEO who was entitled to a higher multiple of salary and bonus under regular 
severance than he was under a GP. 
 82. See id.; Deborah L. Jacobs, How to Get the Best Severance Deal, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2011, 
5:54 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2011/11/02/how-to-play-your-hand-
when-youve-been-fired/. 
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nondisclosure, noncompetition, or nondisparagement provisions.83 
Severance payments may be paid in a lump sum or over time, although 
the latter has become more challenging under recently established tax 
rules aimed at constraining deferred compensation arrangements.84 
Unlike GPs, regular severance never includes any tax gross-ups because 
the tax code does not impose particular penalties on regular severance.85 
Regular severance is rarely, if ever, more lucrative than a GP held by a 
given CEO and is usually less lucrative.  
Regular severance promises may be part of an efficient CEO 
employment contract. As was the case with GPs, a CEO may anticipate 
losing any firm-specific human capital investment and significant future 
cash flows upon a future dismissal from the firm.86 This may be 
particularly significant since high-profile dismissals bring reputational 
harm, making it harder for a fired CEO to obtain a similar position in 
short order and generating personal solvency and liquidity crises.87 As a 
consequence, potential CEOs may avoid taking positions at risky firms 
or may demand higher wages to offset the greater risk.88 Once in office, 
undiversified managers might avoid risky but valuable projects for fear 
of losing their positions in downside scenarios.89 Restricted stock and, in 
particular, stock options partially solve this risk aversion by increasing 
the gain to the executive if the risk pays off.90 Severance agreements, on 
the other hand, operate to compensate if the project fails and the executive 
loses his position.91 Along these lines, regular severance promises may 
                                                                                                                     
 83. See MICHAEL S. MELBINGER, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ¶ 401 (2013); Schwab & 
Thomas, supra note 29, at 254–55.  
84. See I.R.C. § 409A (2012); DURWARD J. GEHRING, APPLYING SECTION 409A TO 
SEVERANCE BENEFITS 2 (2010), http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/news_item/baa36085-d2a4-
4ef3-bfb1-67338f98ae90_documentupload.pdf (“If the employee has no legally binding right to 
receive compensation in a future year, there is no deferred compensation in the first place. . . . If 
severance pay is paid in installments that could be paid in years after the year of termination, the 
severance pay may be subject to Section 409A unless it meets one of the other exceptions.”). 
 85. See Rusticus, supra note 80, at 2 & n.2.  
 86. See C. Edward Fee & Charles J. Hadlock, Management Turnover Across the Corporate 
Hierarchy, 37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 5 (2004). 
 87. See id.; Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. 
ECON. 241, 261 (1989); Hartzell et al., supra note 21, at 49, 51.  
 88. Brian D. Cadman et al., Are Ex-Ante CEO Severance Pay Contracts Consistent with 
Efficient Contracting? 7–8 (Nov. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1773070.  
 89. Id. at 7.  
 90. See John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 9 
FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 27, 29, 33 (2003). Options also limit losses as the 
executive is free to decline to call the shares. 
 91. See Nengjiu Ju et al., Options, Option Repricing in Managerial Compensation: Their 
Effects on Corporate Risk, 29 J. CORP. FIN. 628, 639 (2014). 
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(1) induce a talented CEO to join a firm even though the CEO faces a 
significant information deficit regarding the firm and (2) encourage risk-
taking once in place.92 Firms operating in volatile environments or where 
the CEO is new to the organization typically should be more likely to 
make regular severance promises.93 Similarly, regular severance 
promises should appear more often in contracts covering CEOs who 
might bear particularly large labor market penalties following a 
termination.94  
On the other hand, regular severance promises may represent run-of-
the-mill rent extraction by powerful managers. The managerial power 
may be a product of the agency problems Professors Bebchuk and Jesse 
M. Fried famously described,95 or it may simply reflect an overestimation 
of marginal CEO value in board negotiations with new hires, particularly 
new hires from outside of the firm.96 In either case, regular severance 
promises may reflect rents obtained by management as a result of these 
sorts of market inefficiencies rather than provisions that increase 
shareholder wealth.  
Even in a world of arm’s length bargaining, prior theoretical accounts 
were ambivalent as to whether regular severance enhances firm value 
generally. As discussed above, severance agreements may encourage 
CEOs to take on risky but valuable projects.97 Yet such promises are also 
open to an effort-disincentive critique similar to the one leveled at GPs. 
If the threat of termination for poor performance motivates CEOs to exert 
effort, then reducing the costs of such terminations might lead to less 
effort.98 Thus, an alternative hypothesis regarding severance adoption is 
that it would be correlated with higher risk-taking but lower firm value 
going forward. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 92. See Stuart L. Gillan et al., Explicit Versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO 
Employment Agreements, 64 J. FINANCE 1629, 1631 (2009); Ju et al., supra note 91, at 638. 
 93. Gillan et al., supra note 92, at 1631; Roman Inderst & Holger M. Mueller, CEO 
Compensation and Private Information: An Optimal Contracting Perspective 4–5 (N.Y. Univ., 
Working Paper No. CLB-06-022, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1 
291610; see also Rusticus, supra note 80, at 8–9 (summarizing other arguments for the 
efficiency of regular severance, including encouraging CEOs to share bad news). 
 94. For instance, younger or poorer CEOs, or those currently enjoying large compensation 
levels, will bear larger costs from an involuntary termination than older or wealthier CEOs or 
those paid less. See Gillan et al., supra note 92, at 1635 (providing evidence that CEOs expecting 
to earn greater abnormal compensation over time are more likely to have contractual protection). 
 95. E.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 8 (2004); Bebchuk 
et al., supra note 24, at 784.  
 96. For more on the unique attributes of negotiations over new CEO hires, see RAKESH 
KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR 186–203 (2004). 
 97. See supra text accompanying note 92.  
 98. See Rusticus, supra note 80, at 7. 
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Relatively little work, however, has been done to examine the 
question of regular severance’s effect on firm performance. Professors 
Stewart J. Schwab and Randall S. Thomas, using a database compiled by 
The Corporate Library, found high levels of regular severance in CEO 
employment contracts.99 But they found CEO employment contracts for 
only 375 of 865 firms that responded to The Corporate Library’s 
inquiry.100 Similarly, Professors Stuart Gillan, Jay C. Hartzell, and Robert 
Parrino found only 225 explicit CEO employment agreements either 
voluntarily provided to The Corporate Library or referenced in SEC 
filings on EDGAR among S&P 500 firms in 2000.101 Professor Tjomme 
O. Rusticus studied a sample of agreements with starting CEOs hired 
from 1994 through 1999.102 He hand collected severance agreements 
referenced in SEC filings and found that just over half of the CEOs in 
that cohort of 305 had some sort of severance promise in their 
agreements.103 He also found conflicting evidence on the relationship 
between severance promises and CEO turnover.104 Finally, economist 
Peggy Huang found that straight severance incidence correlated with 
higher investment levels but that the higher investment was value-
decreasing for firms.105  
Professors Brian D. Cadman, John L. Campbell, and Sandy Klasa 
hand collected post-2006 proxy data and found high levels of regular 
severance relative to historic estimations by database providers.106 
Moreover, they found that regular severance is correlated with stock 
return volatility, firm leverage, and focused (as opposed to diversified) 
                                                                                                                     
 99. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 29, at 251. 
 100. Id. at 240, 242. Surprised by this finding, Professors Schwab and Thomas were 
eventually able to track down documents to allow them to conclude that the “vast majority” of 
CEOs had some sort of contractual arrangement regarding their employment but did not indicate 
whether the newly discovered arrangements provided for severance. Id. at 241. 
 101. Gillan et al., supra note 92, at 1636–37. Of the agreements they studied, 91.8% had 
terms distinguishing terminations with and without cause. Id. at 1638–39. Even assuming each of 
those contracts offered payments upon without-cause terminations, the numbers imply that over 
half of S&P 500 CEOs are operating without regular severance protection. Studies from earlier 
eras reveal even smaller numbers. See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Managerial 
Compensation and the Threat of Takeover, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 219, 226 (1998) (noting that twelve 
percent of Forbes 800 firms had CEO employment agreements). 
 102. Rusticus, supra note 80, at 17–18. 
 103. Id. at 18. The 305-firm sample was drawn from the S&P 1500. Consistent with other 
studies, Professor Rusticus found that eighty-six percent of CEOs in his sample had some form 
of a GP. Id. For those CEOs who obtained severance promises, the median promised payout was 
equivalent to $2,278,000, about three-quarters of which came in the form of cash. Id. at 19. 
 104. Id. at 33–34. 
 105. Peggy Huang, Marital Prenups? A Look at CEO Severance Agreements 29 (Mar. 15, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1786540. 
 106. Cadman et al., supra note 88, at 2, 3 n.4. 
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acquisitions—each a proxy for firm risk-taking.107 Finally, they found 
some indication of increased firm value, using acquisition announcement 
returns and the contribution of cash holdings to firm value as proxies.108 
However, Professors Cadman, Campbell, and Klasa did not control for 
GP adoption, leaving open the possibility that GP promises rather than 
regular severance drive the correlations. 
C.  A Fresh Look at Golden Parachutes and Effort Incentives  
Do CEOs with GPs exert less effort? Do regular severance promises 
create similar incentives? If both, which is more important? The 
empirical studies undertaken to this point are unclear on these questions. 
Significant endogeneity concerns remain, with studies showing a 
correlation between GP adoption and lower firm values. Moreover, 
although earlier work suggesting GP effort-incentive effects controlled 
for regular severance,109 the studies used IRRC databases for pre-2006 
periods that indicated startlingly low levels of severance.110 Prior to 2006, 
researchers (including IRRC) had to rely on voluntary provision of 
severance terms to research requests111 or to comb through CEO 
agreements and severance plans intermittently filed as exhibits to 
periodic reports.112 For instance, in 2004, the IRRC database reported that 
only 6.0% of firms offered straight severance promises to their CEOs.113 
Professors Cadman, Campbell, and Klasa, however, found CEO straight 
severance at 73.7% of firms in their hand-collected sample covering 
2006–2007,114 generally consistent with the 50.2% and 72.0% of S&P 
1500 firms ExecuComp found in 2006 and 2013 respectively and the 
63.8% we find in our hand-collected sample of 2009 S&P 500 firms.115 
Some of the disparity may reflect changes in contracting between the pre- 
and post-2006 periods. Certainly, it is logical that the demand for 
severance would rise as CEO positions became more precarious over this 
period.116 However, the stark differences between the historical IRRC 
data and the recent data from ExecuComp, Professors Cadman, 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Id. at 22–28. 
 108. Id. at 29. 
 109. See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 110. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., What Matters?, supra note 7, at 783–84, 797 (reporting 
severance arrangements in 2002 at only 6.1% of firms); see also Agrawal & Knoeber, supra note 
101, at 228 (noting that only two percent of Forbes 800 firms had both GPs and explicit executive 
employment contracts). 
 111. See, e.g., Schwab & Thomas, supra note 29, at 240. 
 112. See, e.g., Rusticus, supra note 80, at 5; Schwab & Thomas, supra note 29, at 241. 
 113. Data on file with authors. 
 114. Cadman et al., supra note 88, at 2, 17–18. 
 115. Data on file with authors. 
 116. See infra Subsection I.C.1. 
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Campbell, Klasa, and this Article indicate that prior studies that evaluated 
GPs while controlling for severance may have used inaccurate datasets. 
At the very least, the disparity calls into question the applicability of prior 
work’s GP-incentive-effect findings to today’s contracting environment.  
Prior to a discussion of the empirical analysis, this Article examines 
whether a GP or straight severance is more likely to provide effort-
disincentive effects in today’s CEO labor market. Because CEOs were 
rarely fired outside of the change in control context during earlier periods, 
it may have been plausible to believe that GPs were the crucial post-
termination promise for CEO incentives.117 However, there is more 
reason today to believe that straight severance should create equal or 
greater effort disincentives than a GP in many circumstances. Poor-
performing CEOs face far more significant labor market penalties outside 
of the takeover context than before.118 Moreover, a well-known practice 
of paying ex post “deal bounties” to target CEOs119 has provided a 
substitute for ex ante GP promises, making them potentially less 
important to CEO incentives. Finally, GP values are more dependent on 
share prices than straight severance values,120 potentially mitigating 
incentives for CEOs to slack. Given these phenomena it seems plausible 
that straight severance will play a greater role vis-à-vis GPs in shaping 
CEO behavior than they may have in prior periods. 
1.  The New CEO Labor Market and Regular Severance 
GPs arose in a corporate governance environment where acquirers 
were seen as the most, and perhaps only, dynamic actors among potential 
monitors.121 Shareholders at public companies were dispersed and 
rationally ignorant, and boards were seen as yielding and generally 
absent.122 For example, CEO turnover was so rare outside the takeover 
context that many believed the managerial labor market produced few 
                                                                                                                     
 117. See, e.g., Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, CEO Turnover and Relative Performance 
Evaluation, 70 J. FINANCE 2155, 2163 (2015) (excluding CEO turnovers associated with mergers 
from the CEO turnover analysis); Lucian A. Taylor, Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from 
Structural Estimation, 65 J. FINANCE 2051, 2064 (2010) (excluding CEO dismissals due to a 
takeover in the study involving the low occurrence of CEO firings).  
 118. See supra text accompanying note 94.   
 119. See infra Subsection I.C.2.  
 120. See Marcia Heroux Pounds, Office Depot CEO Could Walk with $39 Million After 
Merger, SUN SENTINEL (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:51 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/
consumer/fl-office-depot-ceo-golden-parachute-20150210-story.html. 
 121. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity 
in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 123 (2001). 
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incentive effects.123 Product markets and capital markets compelled some 
level of managerial effort, but the market for corporate control was 
commonly understood to be the most important constraint on managerial 
slack.  
However, alternative devices to drive managerial effort have become 
far more robust over time.124 Institutional shareholders hold a greater 
share of the public equity market than ever before.125 Hedge funds have 
taken the lead in a new brand of shareholder activism and have drafted 
otherwise sleepy monitors like mutual funds to their side in battles with 
management.126 Proxy advisory firms have increased their influence, 
lowering monitoring costs generally.127 And, at the same time that 
shareholders have increased their monitoring activities, boards have 
become more active in enforcing share price maximization and other 
                                                                                                                     
 123. See, e.g., Core et al., supra note 90, at 30, 45 n.2 (2003) (noting that the assumption of 
ignoring termination threats for incentive purposes “likely does not hold for CEOs with large 
turnover probabilities”). Research at the end of the twentieth century confirmed this view. Kevin 
J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2547 (Orley 
C. Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (finding a 7.9% probability of departure for young CEOs 
at average-performing firms increasing only to an 8.5% probability if the young CEO’s firm 
realizes returns 30% below industry average); Kevin J. Murphy & Ján Zábojník, Managerial 
Capital and the Market for CEOs, 28–30 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=984376 (finding “departure probabilities for 
CEOs realizing returns 30% below the industry average were increased by 0.4% in the 1970s, 
0.7% in the 1980s, and 0.4% in the 1990s” and concluding that “the turnover-performance 
relation . . . has fallen since the 1980s”). 
 124. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 691–709 (2010); Kahan & Rock, supra note 22, at 896–
97; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1039–40, 1051 (2010).  
 125. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 124, at 998 (“Mutual funds . . . have taken off, tripling 
their percentage holdings from 7% to 22%.”); see also Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public 
Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1356 (2010) (noting that ownership of public companies 
has become more institutionalized). 
 126. Kahan & Rock, supra note 124, at 998, 1001–04. For more on the interplay between 
activist investors and mutual and pension fund voting, see generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey 
N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of 
Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013) (finding that institutionalized ownership of 
equity has led to an agency problem because institutional records owners and beneficial owners 
do not have the same interests). For a recent example of this phenomenon, consider the saga of 
Sotheby’s, in which Daniel Loeb’s activism led to the CEO’s departure. See Laura Lorenzetti, 
Sotheby’s CEO Steps Down After an Extended Activist Investor Battle, FORTUNE (Nov. 21, 2014, 
10:40 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/11/21/sothebys-ceo-steps-down-after-an-extended-activist-
investor-battle/. 
 127. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 124, at 1005. For an example of how proxy advisory 
firms wield influence over governance questions, see Andrew C.W. Lund, Say on Pay’s Bundling 
Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119, 121, 126–27 (2010). 
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shareholder-friendly rules.128 At least partially as a result of this more 
interventionist environment, executive compensation has tilted heavily 
toward a performance-based pay model.129 This tilt may itself have 
affected CEO effort.130 
The new interventionism has led most directly, however, to a far more 
penal managerial labor market at public companies. Between 1992 and 
2007, the CEO turnover rate was 15.8% annually, and the average tenure 
of a CEO was less than seven years.131 The increased turnover rate was 
not random either. CEO terminations were closely linked with changes 
in share price measured against industry-adjusted and market-adjusted 
performance. The correlation between poor performance and turnover is 
particularly strong in cases of lagging performance on an industry-
adjusted basis, and boards are correspondingly more generous to CEOs 
where a firm at least outperforms its industry.132 This “limited 
arbitrariness” provides significant effort incentives to CEOs at firms 
where below-median industry-adjusted performance is more than a de 
minimis possibility,133 exactly the sorts of firms that are likely to be 
potential takeover targets. While there may remain a threshold level of 
underperformance necessary to trigger labor market discipline,134 it is 
                                                                                                                     
 128. See Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay 
in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 693, 705 n.121 (2011). 
 129. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 128, at 684–85. But see Bebchuk et al., supra note 24, 
at 754 (presenting their managerial power model of executive compensation). 
 130. Elsewhere, one of us has criticized the assumption that performance-based pay currently 
produces exceptionally important CEO incentive effects. See Andrew C.W. Lund, Compensation 
as Signaling, 64 FLA. L. REV. 591, 600–04 (2012); Lund & Polsky, supra note 128, at 682–83. 
Even if redesigned compensation structures can no longer deliver on the promise to dramatically 
reshape CEO incentives, the shift to performance-based pay was likely significant at some point. 
 131. Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12 
INT’L REV. FIN. 57, 58 (2012). Similar results were reached in a recent study on CEO tenure. Joann 
S. Lublin, CEO Tenure, Stock Gains Often Go Hand-in-Hand, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2010, 
12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703900004575325172681419254.
html (finding that the average S&P 500 CEO tenure is 6.6 years and that—excluding founders—
only twenty-eight such executives have had tenures exceeding fifteen years).  
 132. See Jenter & Kanaan, supra note 117, at 2165–79; see also Lund & Polsky, supra note 
128, at 702–04 (finding a correlation between poor performance and CEO turnover, but noting 
that boards can filter out “exogenous shocks” to firm share price as long as CEOs outperform 
peers in the industry). 
 133. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 128, at 704.   
 134. See, e.g., Jenter & Kanaan, supra note 117, at 2160–61; see also John C. Coates IV & 
Reinier Kraakman, CEO Tenure, Performance and Turnover in S&P 500 Companies 15–17 
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 191/2007; Harvard Law Sch., 
Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 595, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=925532 (explaining patterns of CEO turnover in terms of a “term structure” wherein CEOs are 
unlikely to depart in the first three-year term, much more likely to depart in the subsequent term, 
and relatively unlikely to depart in the final term). 
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hard to imagine CEOs with career concerns exploiting any slack in such 
a labor market. 
This more penal labor market obviously makes straight severance 
more relevant to CEO incentives than it would have been in prior eras 
when terminations effectively only occurred post-takeover. As straight 
severance protections become relatively more important to CEOs vis-à-
vis GPs, it is to be expected that effort disincentives related to straight 
severance should also become more pronounced.  
2.  Renegotiating Promises and Introducing Promises Midstream 
Regular severance promises, like GPs, are ex ante promises made by 
a firm to its CEO that inform the CEO’s expectation of payouts in the 
event of his termination.135 But it may be that a CEO believes he will be 
able to extract a payout from the firm at the time of his future termination 
in any event. Earlier work finds some evidence supporting such an 
expectation.136 If so, that possibility should make the provisions’ 
marginal incentive effects weaker. As the CEO is more certain of his 
ability to gain ex post severance, the ex ante promise becomes less 
important. Effort disincentives may exist, but they no longer depend on 
the presence of a contractual promise.  
But such ad hoc contracting dynamics, if they exist, would seem more 
relevant in the GP context. For regular involuntary terminations, 
departing CEOs will likely have at least some difficulty extracting 
additional severance payments from firms beyond that specified in their 
contracts.137 What leverage they have consists mainly of personal 
relationships with directors (who just fired them), public relations 
headaches to avoid, and possibly noncompetition promises.  
Ahead of a takeover, on the other hand, an incumbent CEO will often 
have the ability as gatekeeper to condition the acquisition on her personal 
receipt of substantial sums.138 Recall that this phenomenon is largely the 
cause of GPs becoming common in the first place. Studies have found 
that CEOs without GPs are able to extract significant additional 
compensation from bidders through the takeover process.139 If, as seems 
plausible, parties informally negotiate deal bounties as opposed to 
                                                                                                                     
 135. See supra Section I.B.   
 136. See, e.g., David Yermack, Golden Handshakes: Rewards for CEOs Who Leave 1–2, 9 
(N.Y. Univ., Working Paper No. FIN-04-020, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1294455 (finding “only a minority of [observed] severance pay is delivered according 
to pre-negotiated contracts”). 
 137. See id. at 7 (“CEOs who are dismissed should receive little or no severance [outside of 
contracted-for amounts], since their ability probably proved to be lower than expected.”). 
 138. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
 139. See, e.g., Broughman, supra note 20, at 5–9. 
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satisfied private equity firms bestowing them as ex post gifts, parties will 
likely similarly bestow such bounties even when the target CEO does not 
continue as an employee of the firm. Other studies validate this 
expectation. Professor Brian Broughman summarized much of this work 
and found that bounties or side payments averaged $2 million for CEOs 
of target firms.140 Side payments consist of enhancements to existing 
GPs, amounts paid in exchange for noncompetition pledges or consulting 
services, and unscheduled stock option grants ahead of a deal’s 
announcement.141 These amounts do not take into account compensation 
paid for continued employment, which may also function as a non-GP 
side payment.142 
The existence of side payments tends to cut against an effort-
disincentive hypothesis as it relates to GPs. Predictable side payments 
should make ex ante GPs less important to CEO behavior since CEOs can 
expect to extract ex post GPs in any event. In terms of CEO effort, this 
implies that CEOs with GPs should behave similarly to those without 
them. Certain boards may be able to override CEO resistance to a deal, 
thereby removing the CEO’s leverage to extract side payments from an 
acquirer.143 A CEO cognizant of his vulnerable position vis-à-vis side-
payment extraction would tend to be influenced by the guarantee of 
compensation and might exert less effort than one without the contractual 
protection. But the argument for GPs providing effort disincentives that 
are unique from those provided by regular severance then requires a 
board that is (1) able to force a CEO to promote a takeover and (2) not 
interested in terminating the employment of a CEO outside of the 
takeover context for exerting low effort or taking too little risk.  
3.  Equity-Heavy GPs 
Finally, a significant portion of a GP’s value consists of accelerated 
vesting of equity awards. ExecuComp does not distinguish between the 
components of a GP, but in our hand-collected data we found that 81.9% 
of GPs involve the acceleration of some amount of equity, with the 
median value of such accelerated equity equaling 34.7% of the total GP 
package. Regular severance, on the other hand, is much less likely to 
include accelerated vesting of equity. In many cases, departing CEOs 
forfeit all unvested equity awards. We found that only 50.6% of regular 
                                                                                                                     
 140. Broughman, supra note 20, at 7.  
 141. Id. at 6. Professors Jay C. Hartzell, Eli Ofek, and David Yermack suggest that these side 
payments are substitutes for continued employment. See Hartzell et al., supra note 21, at 44. When 
continued employment is observed, CEO compensation increases over pre-deal compensation by 
over $4 million, implying that this is the cost perceived by incumbent managers of being subject 
to a takeover. See id. at 44, 52–53. 
 142. See Broughman, supra note 20, at 5–7. 
 143. See id. at 6. 
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severance packages include such vesting, with a median value of 43.9% 
of a severance package. 
Accordingly, if the safety net provided by GPs is contingent to a great 
extent on share price received in the takeover, the CEO has reason to exert 
at least some minimal level of effort to support that price. On the other 
hand, because regular severance payouts are less a function of share price, 
they do not provide even that floor for CEO effort. In both cases, the CEO 
will have significant vested equity holdings providing some effort 
incentives regardless of post-termination payment promises, but at the 
margins GPs seem more apt to include incentives to drive shareholder 
value.  
Taking all of this together, one would expect that regular severance, 
depending upon its magnitude relative to a GP, would produce equally or 
more significant effort disincentives than GPs, contrary to the recent 
studies measuring GP effort disincentives. In the next Part, this Article 
tests this hypothesis. 
II.  EFFECTS ON PERFORMANCE 
The goal was to quantify specific types of post-termination promises 
and examine their effects, if any, on CEO incentives using the same 
types of empirical approaches used in the past with GPs. Thus, we 
compiled regular severance and GP arrangements for the 2006–2013 
period at S&P 1500 firms. We generally used ExecuComp, which began 
coding the information in 2006. We also hand collected 2009 
arrangements at S&P 500 firms after reviewing proxy statements as a 
check on ExecuComp’s coding, which has been questioned.144 Contrary 
to Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang’s work on the 1990–2007 
period,145 we found that the presence of a GP in the 2006–2013 period 
did not have a statistically significant relationship with either current 
Tobin’s Q or Tobin’s Q two years following observation of the GP. 
Moreover, when we controlled for severance during this period, 
severance was significantly negatively related to both measures. For the 
first time in the literature, we not only controlled for GPs using indicator 
variables as done in prior studies, but we also used continuous variables 
for GP and severance dollar amounts. Even using dollar amounts, we 
still did not find a statistically significant relationship between GP 
amounts and firm performance in recent years. But we did find a 
significant and negative relationship between firm value and 
severance.146 
                                                                                                                     
 144. See supra text accompanying note 106 (Professors Cadman, Campbell, and Klasa 
questioned the database’s information prior to 2006 because historic estimations of severance 
agreements were found to be inaccurate). 
 145. See Bebchuk, et al., Wealth of Shareholders, supra note 7, at 143.   
 146. In unreported results, we examined the stock performance of firms with and without 
GPs using more recent data. Unlike the earlier studies, we did not find that firms with GPs 
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A.  Data Collection and Sample Description 
We observed GP and severance data for S&P 1500 firms in 2006–
2013 using ExecuComp’s database. We additionally hand-collected data 
on GPs and regular severance at S&P 500 firms as reported on their 2009 
proxy statements.147 As of 2006, SEC rules require public companies to 
tabulate all post-termination payments they were obligated to make to 
named executive officers.148 Before that change, researchers faced 
considerable difficulties in determining the values promised to CEOs 
upon departure—whether voluntary or involuntary, related to a change in 
control or not.149 Even with the tabulation requirements, the coding 
process is not trivial and requires substantial analysis and interpretation. 
Perhaps as a result, our estimates of post-termination amounts often differ 
slightly from those of ExecuComp, though our estimates of incidence are 
broadly consistent.150   
In our hand-coding exercise, we collected information on the amount 
of post-termination compensation promised and its terms. We divided 
termination payments into three groups: (1) amounts payable upon 
voluntary termination; (2) amounts payable only upon termination 
without cause or for good reason; and (3) GPs—amounts payable upon a 
change in control of the firm, a termination without cause, or a resignation 
for good reason in the context of a change in control.151 Professors 
Cadman, Campbell, and Klasa specifically excluded the first category, 
which consists of retirement accounts and deferred compensation 
accounts, because they were looking specifically for incremental risk-
taking incentives provided by severance agreements.152 It is likely that 
such vested amounts, if large enough, create a wealth effect that would 
make regular severance and GPs inconsequential with respect to CEO 
                                                                                                                     
experience negative abnormal returns relative to non-GP firms, further highlighting the notion 
that the earlier conclusions about GPs’ supposed disincentive effects may have been an artifact of 
the data in that particular time period and not a universal or robust result. 
 147. For firms issuing proxy statements in October, November, or December, we used the 
2008 proxies. 
 148. See, e.g., Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Exchange 
Act Release Nos. 33-8732A, 34-54302A, 2006 WL 6325877 (Aug. 29, 2009). 
 149. For more on the specific difficulties, see Cadman et al., supra note 88, at 12 & nn.9–
10. 
 150. Professors Cadman, Campbell, and Klasa note the same issue in their study of 2007 
proxies. Id. at 15–16. Also, our data covers only S&P 500 firms while ExecuComp includes S&P 
1500 firms. 
 151. Many payments are conditioned on the CEO entering into non-competition or 
confidentiality agreements with the firm, which we assumed to be regularly completed. 
 152. See Cadman et al., supra note 88, at 13. 
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incentives.153 It would be fruitful in future work to incorporate measures 
of background wealth in determining the incentive effects of post-
termination promises. 
ExecuComp codes GPs as values payable due to a termination related 
to a change in control and severance as values payable due to an 
involuntary, without-cause termination.154 Consistent with earlier studies, 
we merged the ExecuComp and hand-collected data with annual financial 
data from the CRSP–Compustat merged sample by fiscal year and firm-
identifying information. We also merged in firm CEO and insider 
characteristics, such as CEO age, tenure, and ownership from 
ExecuComp. We excluded firms from our dataset if there were missing 
variables from these sources. Our final sample includes 11,147 
observations.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics regarding firms and post-
termination promises for the period. 
Table 1: Characteristics of CEOs in Sample 
 count mean
155 p5 p50 p95 
Tenure 11,147 8.99 2.00 7.00 24.00 
Total annual compensation 11,147 5763.85 666.27 3848.25 16,847.63 
Salary 11,147 810.92 310.00 763.75 1456.00 
Bonus 11,147 227.16 0.00 0.00 1100.00 
Value of CEO equity holdings 11,073 111,196.01 1164.86 17,981.02 254,138.75 
Value of accumulated pension 11,146 3233.03 0.00 0.00 17,517.50 
Aggregate deferred 
compensation 11,147 2876.74 0.00 183.37 12,224.43 
ExecuComp CIC 11,147 13,962.76 0.00 7881.99 47,450.79 
ExecuComp severance 11,147 7245.08 0.00 2042.69 30,967.39 
ExecuComp CIC > $1M 8770 17,724.31 1968.17 11,367.29 51,875.00 
ExecuComp severance > $1M 6611 12,146.55 1312.25 6058.36 40,266.02 
 
The median CEO in our sample was fifty-six years old and had a 
tenure of seven years. The median annual compensation for CEOs was 
about $3.85 million. The average post-termination obligation to a CEO 
under any termination circumstances (i.e., vested amounts) was $3.23 
million in pension amounts and $2.88 million in deferred compensation 
balances, both of which were dwarfed by CEO equity holdings, with the 
average CEO holding $111 million in vested company equity with a 
median of almost $18 million.  
The average post-termination obligation to a CEO following a 
                                                                                                                     
 153. For an explanation of how wealth effects on CEO incentives are likely to be large but 
difficult to measure, see John Core & Wayne Guay, The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal 
Equity Incentive Levels, 28 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151, 179–80 (1999). 
 154. See, e.g., Cadman et al., supra note 88, at 8 (“Earlier work on CEO severance pay has 
focused on payments, often called golden parachutes, that CEOs receive when their firms are 
acquired. . . . More recently, there has been interest in severance payments given to dismissed 
CEOs that are not paid out in the context of a firm being acquired.”).  
 155.  Numbers represent thousands. 
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“without cause” or “good reason” departure (i.e., regular severance) was 
$7.25 million, and the median amount was $2.04 million. During the 
sample period, severance incidence ranged (and continuously increased) 
from 50.2% of firms (2006) to 72.0% (2013). The percentage of CEOs 
with promised severance of more than $1 million ranged from 45.6% 
(2006) to 64.3% (2013). Conditioned on the CEO having a regular 
severance promise of more than $1 million, the median promised 
payment was $6.06 million. In sum, this data confirms Professors 
Cadman, Campbell, and Klasa’s findings on severance incidence and 
suggests a significant departure from the IRRC severance data from 1990 
to 2006, in which regular severance incidence ranged from 5.8% to 13.6% 
of firms.  
The average obligation to a CEO under a GP is $13.96 million, and 
the median amount is $7.88 million. During the sample period, GP 
incidence ranged from 69.7% of firms (2006) to 85.6% (2013). The 
number of CEOs with promised GPs of more than $1 million ranged from 
67.6% (2006) to 83.7% (2013). Conditioned on the CEO having a GP 
with a value over $1 million, the median promised payment is $11.37 
million—slightly less than two times the median of regular severance 
promises.  
As expected, there is significant overlap between GP firms and 
severance firms. In the sample from 2006, 91.9% of CEOs with regular 
severance promises also had GPs, and 66.1% of CEOs with GPs also had 
regular severance promises. For 2013, 95.7% of CEOs with regular 
severance promises also had GPs, while 80.6% of CEOs with GPs also 
had regular severance promises.  
B.  Regular Severance, GPs, and Firm Value 
We first attempted to confirm the earlier finding that the presence of 
a GP is associated with lower firm value. As Table 2 demonstrates, there 
is a significant negative relationship between GP presence and Tobin’s Q 
during the 1990–2006 period and a negative but insignificant relationship 
in the 2006–2013 period. We use Tobin’s Q consistent with the G Index 
and E Index papers but not with the buy-and-hold portfolio approach 
from Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang’s most recent paper.156 
Because we cannot measure adoption of the GP at most firms during the 
sample period, as the vast majority of firms already had GPs, an approach 
focused on returns is unable to rule out the possibility of the market 
pricing the disincentive effects prior to the sample period.157 Similar 
                                                                                                                     
 156. See Bebchuk et al., Wealth of Shareholders, supra note 7, at 151.   
 157. In unreported results, we examined the stock performance of firms with and without 
GPs using more recent data. Unlike the earlier studies, we did not find that firms with GPs 
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concerns likely apply to findings related to severance in the analyses 
below. 
Table 2: GP Incidence Versus Firm Value (Base Case)158 
 
Dependent Variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(5+Qt) ln(5+Qt+2) ln(5+Qt) ln(5+Qt+2) 
Sample: IRRC IRRC ExecuComp ExecuComp 
Period: 1990–2006 1990–2006 
2006–
2013 
2006–
2013 
GP in place (t) -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.008 -0.008 
 (<.001) (<.001) (0.129) (0.150) 
ln(1+Assets) -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
ln(1+Firm Age) -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.010** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (0.001) (0.026) 
Leverage 0.082* 0.066* 0.001 0.007 
 (0.067) (0.078) (0.970) (0.690) 
Delaware -0.003 -0.005 -0.000 -0.005 
 (0.600) (0.358) (0.928) (0.297) 
ROA 0.693*** 0.512*** 0.970*** 0.834*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
CAPEX to Assets 0.380*** 0.256*** 0.336*** 0.282*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
RD per Sales 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.115*** 0.098*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Herfindahl Index -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.509) (0.346) 
Constant 1.713*** 1.696*** 1.704*** 1.717*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Year controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,862 25,862 11,147 11,147 
R-square 0.264 0.181 0.428 0.352 
 
In the first two specifications, we were able to replicate findings from 
earlier studies demonstrating the significance of GP incidence for firm 
performance during the pre-2006 period. Relative-industry Tobin’s Q is 
                                                                                                                     
experience negative abnormal returns relative to non-GP firms, further highlighting the notion 
that the earlier conclusions about GPs’ supposed disincentive effects may have been an artifact of 
the data in that particular time period and not a universal or robust result. 
 158.  Three asterisks shows significance at the 1% confidence level—the most powerful. 
One asterisk represents the 10% level—still significant but less so. Two asterisks is 5%. 
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calculated as the firm’s Q minus the industry median Q for that year 
(either the year of GP observation or two years subsequent, depending 
upon the specification). We added 5 to this value because in cases where 
a firm’s Q is below the industry-median Q, the relative-industry Q can 
range as low as negative 4.8 in the sample. In the first and second 
specifications, we used contemporaneous and forward-looking measures 
of Tobin’s Q using IRRC data for the pre-2006 period studied in earlier 
work. For purposes of measuring CEO incentive effects, the second 
column is particularly important to account for subsequent firm 
performance that may be driven by CEO incentives in the initial year but 
takes time to filter through performance. To avoid survivorship biases, in 
the cases where Q is not available in year t+2 for a firm, we used the Q 
value from t+1. In the third and fourth specifications, we find those results 
do not continue into the post-2006 period as predicted by the effort-
disincentive hypothesis. Our inability to replicate earlier results when 
using more recent data, even when not controlling for severance, calls 
into question that hypothesis.  
We further explored the relation between firm value and incentive 
payments in light of new information about severance. As discussed 
above, IRRC’s pre-2006 data on severance differs remarkably from 
ExecuComp’s for the post-2006 period and our hand-coded data for 
2009.159 Given the high correlation between GPs and regular severance 
in the latter datasets, we added severance as a control to the regressions 
in Table 3. 
Table 3: GP Incidence Versus Firm Value (with Severance Control) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: ln(5+Qt) ln(5+Qt+2) ln(5+Qt) ln(5+Qt+2) 
Sample: IRRC IRRC ExecuComp ExecuComp 
Period: 1990–2006 1990–2006 2006–2013 2006–2013 
GP in place (t) -0.027*** -0.022*** 0.002 0.002 
 (<.001) (<.001) (0.788) (0.809) 
Severance in place (t) -0.007 -0.009 -0.017*** -0.018*** 
 (0.386) (0.254) (<.001) (0.002) 
ln(1+Assets) -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
ln(1+Firm Age) -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.010** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (0.001) (0.019) 
Leverage 0.082* 0.066* 0.002 0.009 
 (0.065) (0.076) (0.887) (0.615) 
Delaware -0.003 -0.005 0.001 -0.004 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See Cadman et al., supra note 88, at 13; supra Part II. 
28
Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss3/4
2016] GOLDEN PARACHUTES 903 
 
 (0.612) (0.369) (0.883) (0.412) 
ROA 0.693*** 0.513*** 0.969*** 0.833*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
CAPEX to Assets 0.379*** 0.255*** 0.335*** 0.282*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
RD per Sales 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.115*** 0.098*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Herfindahl Index -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.604) (0.417) 
Constant 1.714*** 1.698*** 1.706*** 1.719*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Year controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,862 25,862 11,147 11,147 
R-square 0.264 0.181 0.430 0.354 
 
In the first (contemporaneous) and second (forward-looking) 
specifications covering the pre-2006 period, we found that GPs’ 
correlation to firm performance is robust to inclusion of severance as a 
control variable, similar to the results from earlier studies. Recall, 
however, that these specifications use questionable IRRC severance data 
driven by the lack of transparency in reporting severance packages during 
that time.  
For the 2006–2013 period, we used ExecuComp data on severance 
with markedly different results given the changes to disclosure 
requirements discussed above. Indeed, the results show that severance is 
significant under both specifications at the one-percent level. GPs are no 
longer significant and, indeed, their correlation has switched from 
negative to positive (although statistically insignificant). This suggests 
that an omitted severance variable due to data collection problems at 
IRRC may explain earlier findings of the relationship between firm 
performance and GP incidence. Thus, our central finding is that there is 
little evidence that GPs have a CEO effort-disincentive effect, even 
leaving aside the serious endogeneity problems discussed above.160 
                                                                                                                     
 160. In Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Wang do not use Tobin’s Q and instead describe a regression where a monthly portfolio return in 
month t is regressed on the following four factors: 
(Monthly Portfolio Return)t = a + B1(Rm-Rf)t + B2(SMB)t + B3(HML)t + 
B4(Carhart)t + (error)t 
They report the results from this regression where they calculate monthly portfolio return slightly 
differently depending upon the prior, current, or continued status of a firm as a GP adopter. They 
interpret the intercept as the monthly “risk-adjusted excess returns.” See Bebchuk et al., Wealth 
of Shareholders, supra note 7, at 151 (describing buy-hold portfolio methodology). In unreported 
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After the 2006 amendments to the SEC disclosure rules, we were also 
able to more easily observe severance and GP amounts along with 
incidence. More granular detail regarding post-termination promises 
should provide a better view into such promises’ incentive effects. 
Severance and GP promises are not all alike and, indeed, the data shows 
substantial variation among firms. GP and severance amount rather than 
incidence is better able to capture this heterogeneity. Thus, we reran the 
regressions in Table 3, removing binary variables for GP and severance, 
instead using the total amounts promised.  
Table 4: GP Value Versus Firm Value (Base Case with Severance 
Control) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: ln(5+Qt) ln(5+Qt+2) ln(5+Qt) ln(5+Qt+2) 
Sample: ExecuComp ExecuComp ExecuComp ExecuComp 
Period 2006–2013 2006–2013 2006–2013 2006–2013 
ln(Execucomp GP $s) -0.000 -0.000 0.001* 0.001 
 (0.927) (0.597) (0.082) (0.299) 
ln(1+Execucomp severance 
$s)   -0.002*** -0.002*** 
   (<.001) (0.005) 
ln(1+Assets) -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
ln(1+Firm Age) -0.012*** -0.010** -0.013*** -0.010** 
 (0.001) (0.027) (0.001) (0.022) 
Leverage -0.001 0.007 0.001 0.008 
 (0.971) (0.721) (0.950) (0.656) 
Delaware -0.000 -0.005 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.917) (0.294) (0.912) (0.385) 
ROA 0.970*** 0.834*** 0.968*** 0.833*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
CAPEX to Assets 0.337*** 0.283*** 0.337*** 0.282*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
RD per Sales 0.115*** 0.098*** 0.115*** 0.098*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Herfindahl Index -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.513) (0.349) (0.598) (0.406) 
Constant 1.698*** 1.712*** 1.699*** 1.713*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Year controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,147 11,147 11,147 11,147 
R-square 0.427 0.351 0.429 0.353 
                                                                                                                     
results, we replicated the contemporaneous GP adopter analysis using each year’s ExecuComp 
data. We designate each firm as either being a GP or non-GP firm, depending on whether 
ExecuComp reports a non-zero dollar value in the change-in-control payment each year 2006–
2013. We obtained insignificant intercepts using either equal-weighted or value-weighted 
approaches.   
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Similar to the results in Table 3, we found an insignificant correlation 
between GP amounts and firm performance (both forward-looking and 
contemporaneous) when not controlling for severance. When we did 
control for severance amounts, similar to the earlier results, we found a 
statistically significant negative relationship between severance amounts 
and firm performance, although this time at the one-percent level 
(contemporaneous Tobin’s Q) and five-percent level (forward-looking 
Tobin’s Q). The relationship between GP amounts and firm performance 
remained insignificant in the lagged returns and actually was positively 
correlated with firm performance at the ten-percent level. Given 
endogeneity concerns, we were extremely reluctant to interpret these 
findings as indicating that severance provisions harm CEO incentives and 
therefore firm value. Such an interpretation is subject to the same 
omitted-variable rejoinder discussed above in relation to the GP results 
from the pre-2006 period. But our results do suggest that earlier studies, 
hamstrung by the data source’s failure to provide accurate severance 
information, offer little support for a GP-disincentive-effect hypothesis. 
There remains little evidence, then, that GPs harm shareholder value.   
CONCLUSION 
These findings must be cautiously interpreted insofar as they imply 
severance is an important driver of firm value. Interpretations about 
causation are fraught in this sphere given the candidates for omitted variables 
discussed above. Grappling with this endogeneity in some way would be an 
obvious next step in future research. Moreover, we have left concerns about 
CEO background wealth to the side in our analysis, consistent with past 
work. Given the importance that background wealth plausibly has in 
determining effort incentives, future research incorporating related 
adjustments would be welcome.161  
These findings, however, do strongly suggest that the empirical evidence 
previously thought to link GPs with CEO-effort disincentives is suspect. 
Indeed, this Article’s central contribution is demonstrating that earlier 
findings of a relationship between GPs and poor firm performance are not 
robust to the use of more recent data and that the omission of complete data 
regarding regular severance promises may have driven them. This finding 
coincides with uncontroversial theoretical reasons for believing that GPs 
should matter less than regular severance for CEO incentives absent 
extraordinary differences in magnitude. Along this line, the finding that 
severance dominates GPs holds when using newly available continuous 
variables measuring both sorts of post-employment promises.  
                                                                                                                     
 161. Additionally, a straightforward implication of our work is to call into question some of 
the IRRC data from earlier periods that have formed the basis for many important papers in law 
and finance. We cannot say what other fields in those databases are subject to the problems we 
found with respect to severance. 
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In sum, there remains little uncontroverted evidence that GPs pose a 
threat to shareholder value in an environment—especially where regular 
severance is regularly available. We could not rule out the possibility that 
GPs might matter for CEO incentives if companies greatly diminish 
severance. But our findings, along with the mass adoption of GPs across 
firms and the general shareholder acquiescence to their adoption, do call 
into question the special opprobrium GPs receive at the hands of 
regulators, the business press, and some shareholder activists. Perhaps 
companies ought to reduce or dispense with GPs entirely, but the 
argument for doing so must rest for now on grounds other than 
shareholder value.  
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